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With the vigorous development of China’s economy, investment becomes more 
vital and more frequent, and as an important component of corporate decision-making, 
it has great influence on the cash flow, profitability and prospect of the company. 
However, to actually create value for the company, investment efficiency must be 
considered. A variety of studies have been done on investment efficiency, from 
different perspectives involving independent directors governance but with no 
consistent conclusions. Considering that non-executive directors have stronger 
governance motivation than independent directors since most of them are assigned by 
major shareholders, this study will explore corporate’s investment efficiency in the 
perspective of non-executive directors.  
Using a sample of A-share listed firms for the period 2006-2013，this paper has 
empirically tested the influence of non-executive directors on investment efficiency. 
The findings are as follows: (1) In non-state-owned enterprises, non-executive directors 
can improve the investment efficiency significantly, namely, they can not only alleviate 
underinvestment but also inhibit overinvestment; (2) In state-owned enterprises, non-
executive directors make no differences in improving the investment efficiency, and 
further empirical tests show that independent directors play little governance role in 
improving the investment efficiency whatever the ownership is. 
The innovations of this paper can be summarized as the following two points: 
firstly, this paper expands the influence of corporate governance on enterprises’ 
investment efficiency in China in the perspective of non-executive directors; secondly, 
this paper enriches the essence of board independence by clarifying the role of non-
executive directors, no longer taking the proportion of independent directors as proxies 
for board independence as in previous studies. 
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的管理层占据了 5个执行董事席位，另有非执行董事 3人，独立董事 3人。但局
面在大股东黄光裕重得国美电器控制权后发生逆转，在国美电器 2010年年报中，
新增了 2位由大股东黄光裕提名的非执行董事，非执行董事人数上升为 5 人，另
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INVt  = α0 + α1Qt-1 + α2CASHt-1 +α3LISTYt-1 +α4SIZEt-1 +α5LEVt-1 +α6RET t-1 + 





Chen、Hope、Li 和 Wang（2011）[11]的模型是在 Biddle、Hilary和 Verdi（2009）
[12]的基础上提出来的， Biddle等的模型如下: 
INVt = γ0 + γ1RevGrowtht-1 + δ 




营业收入增长率的线性函数，因为 McNichols 和 Stubben （2008）[13]发现“投
资与业务收入增长之间的这种关系在业务收入增加和下降时呈现不对称性”，基
于该想法，他们提出的模型如下： 
INVt = b0 + b1NEGt-1 + b2RevGrowtht-1 + b3 NEGt-1 * RevGrowtht-1 
+ ∑IND + ∑YEAR + μ 
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